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The USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) serves as the nation’s lender of last 
resort by providing direct loans to farmers unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates and 
terms. Annual loan losses have been substantial, averaging $576 million for fiscal 1994-
2004. An econometric model using survey data from a sample of FSA loans originated in 
fiscal 1994-1996 is estimated to identify factors associated with loan losses. The results 
indicate previous debt settlement experience, loan type, farm type, farm size, and farm 
financial characteristics are important factors. This information may be used by FSA to 
adjust its underwriting standards in an effort to reduce loan losses and provide additional 
loans to farmers given its current funding. 
Key Words:  Farm Service Agency, direct loan, loss likelihood, default cost 
 
The USDA’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) serves as the nation’s lender of last 
resort by providing loans to family-size farmers unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates 
and terms despite having adequate repayment capacity and collateral. FSA serves these 
farmers through its direct and guaranteed farm loan programs (FLPs). The guaranteed 
FLP has been emphasized since 1985 and guarantees loans made by commercial creditors 
to farmers meeting FSA eligibility criteria. The direct FLP, which primarily consists of 
operating (OL) loans, real estate-secured farm ownership (FO) loans, and emergency 
disaster (EM) loans, is generally considered to be for less creditworthy farmers who are 
unable to obtain credit from commercial creditors even with a guarantee.    2
Despite the shift in policy from direct loans to loan guarantees, the direct FLP 
remains an important source of credit for many farmers and has about $7 billion in 
principal outstanding. Moreover, the FSA, by mandate, has increasingly targeted its 
direct FLP to socially disadvantaged (SDA) farmers and beginning (BF) farmers.
1  These 
groups of farmers have historically had difficulty obtaining credit because of prejudice 
and lack of experience, respectively. 
Although there may be many social benefits of the direct FLP, which are difficult 
to quantify, the subsidy costs of this program are substantial and are more easily 
quantified. The four components of subsidy costs are defaults net of recoveries, interest, 
fees, and all other costs.
2  Of the four components, the vast majority of subsidy cost in 
recent years (Office of Management and Budget, 2005) is attributed to defaults net of 
recoveries.
3  If default costs were reduced, FSA could provide additional loans to farmers 
                                                 
1 FSA defines a socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher as “one of a group whose 
members have been subjected to racial, ethnic, or gender prejudice because of their 
identity as members of the group without regard to their individual qualities.  For 
purposes of FSA programs, socially disadvantaged (SDA) groups are women, African 
Americans, American Indians, Alaskan Natives, Hispanics, and Asian Americans and 
Pacific Islanders.” (USDA/FSA, 2005a). The definition of a beginning farmer (BF) varies 
by loan type.  For OL purposes, a BF is a farmer who meets the general eligibility criteria 
for an OL loan and has ten or less years of farming experience.  For FO purposes, a BF is 
a farmer who meets the general criteria for an FO loan, has three to ten years of farming 
experience, and owns acreage which does not exceed 30 percent of the county average 
farm size, although, the acreage limit was 25 percent of the county average farm size 
prior to 2004 (U.S. 7 CFR 1943.4).  If the applicant is an entity, all members must be 
related by blood or marriage, and all stockholders in a corporation must be eligible 
beginning farmers (USDA/FSA, 2005b). 
2 The fee component is applicable to FSA guaranteed loans since a 1 percent fee is 
collected. However, the fee component is not applicable to FSA direct loans since fees 
are not collected. 
3 Interest subsidy via the limited resource and EM interest rates is very costly when 
Government borrowing rates are high (Koenig and Dodson, 1998). However, regular OL 
and regular FO interest rates, which reflect the Government’s borrowing rate, have been   3
given its current funding level. For this reason, this article focuses on identifying factors 
associated with default cost as measured by the sum of lost principal and accrued interest. 
By identifying factors associated with direct FLP loan losses, FSA will be able to develop 
a better prediction of the success or failure of a given loan. Also, FSA may be able to use 
this information to adjust its underwriting standards in an effort to reduce loan losses. 
The following section of the article discusses FSA’s direct FLP loan losses for FY 
1994–2004. The subsequent section describes the collection of data for a sample of FSA 
direct loans originated in FY 1994-1996. Next, an econometric model to identify factors 
associated with loan loss occurrences and loan loss rates is presented and estimated. The 
results from the model are then used to investigate how changes in credit standards may 
result in changes to future loan losses. 
Recent Loan Loss Experience for the FSA Direct FLP 
The FSA direct FLP has persistently experienced large loan losses and loss rates. 
During FY1994–2004, the average annual loss of principal and interest for OL, FO, and 
EM loans combined was $576 million. Over the same period, the largest loss ($1,125 
million) occurred in 1996 and the smallest loss ($260 million) occurred most recently in 
2004 (table 1). Also, 10.7 percent was the highest loss rate for the period and happened in 
1996, whereas the lowest rate of just below 3.6 percent occurred in 2001. 
The amounts of direct FLP loan losses have generally trended downward over FY 
1994–2004. Part of the explanation for the downward trend is that FSA was still reacting 
in the 1990s to the financial crisis in agriculture of the early and mid-1980s.  Of the three 
                                                                                                                                                 
near or below the limited resource rate of 5 percent and the emergency disaster rate of 
3.75 percent since 2000, such that interest subsidy has been relatively minor.    4
loan types, EM loans consistently experienced the largest losses, except for 2004 when 
OL loans sustained higher losses.  
It might have been expected that FO loans would have experienced the highest 
losses since they have the largest volume of outstanding principal in each year. However, 
FO loans have the lowest average annual loss ($88 million) compared with those of OL 
($148 million) and EM ($341 million). It is not surprising that EM loans experienced 
such large losses since farmers must have experienced large losses of production (30 
percent or more), and associated income losses, as the result of a natural disaster to 
qualify for such loans.   
The beginning-of-year outstanding principal for direct FO and EM loans 
decreased consistently every year during the period. These decreasing balances are likely 
the result of decreasing obligation authority or decreasing demand in recent years relative 
to earlier years. A consistently declining balance has not been the case for OL loans. The 
beginning-of-year outstanding principal for OL loans decreased annually from $3,100 
million in 1994 to $2,559 million in 1999, and oscillated the rest of the period, ending 
with $2,723 million in 2004.  
Loan loss percentages in table 1 are computed from principal and interest losses and 
beginning-of-year outstanding principal balances.  The loss percentages for the three direct loan 
types have trended downward over the period.  EM loans have the highest loss percentage with 
an average annual percentage loss of 13.2 percent, followed by OL loans with 5.3 percent and 
FO loans with 2.0 percent.  
The EM loss percentage was particularly high in 1996 when over one dollar of principal 
and interest was lost for every four dollars of beginning-of-year outstanding principal. The   5
unusually large losses may have been the result of drought in the southwestern United States. 
These losses may have also been the result of procedural changes. FSA suspended some 
foreclosures in March 1993 pending a review of its implementation of borrower appeal rules.  
The suspension was lifted in February 1994 and a taskforce was formed to collect from 
borrowers with delinquent, large loans. The taskforce’s assignment was expanded in August 
1994 to collect on delinquent loans of all sizes for the next two years (USDA/ERS, 1995). 
Therefore, there may have been a backlog of loans in foreclosure and greater emphasis was 
placed on collecting delinquent loans. Again, it is expected that EM loans have large losses since 
these loans are given to farmers who have experienced significant income losses because of 
natural disasters. Also, an EM loan if used as an annual production loan may be secured less well 
than a corresponding OL loan. An EM loan may only have the growing crop as security, whereas 
an OL loan may have other chattel property as security in addition to the growing crop, 
particularly if FSA also has a seven-year OL loan with the farmer that is secured by 
intermediate-term assets. In addition, FSA may have a lower lien position if a borrower has 
credit from multiple sources, thus FSA would be more likely to suffer a loss if secured assets are 
liquidated.  
It is not surprising that FO loans had lower loss percentages than OL and EM loans. FO 
loans are secured with real estate while OL and EM loans may be secured with non-real estate or 
real estate. Real estate tends to maintain its value better than non-real estate, particularly over 
this period when the U.S. average farm real estate-value per acre has increased every year 
(USDA/NASS, 2004a).  In addition, when cash flows are insufficient to service all debts, real 
estate-secured loans are more likely to be paid first by farmers since loss of this asset is more 
critical to the farm business as a going concern than a non-real estate asset. Moreover, there is   6
often more equity to protect in real estate assets than non-real estate assets. Also, farmers are 
generally more attached to their farmland than non-real estate assets, particularly if the farmland 
has been owned by their family for a number of years. Therefore, farmers may take greater care 
not to lose the family homestead, potentially holding more equity, than a tractor which is easily 
replaced and may have little equity.  In addition, FSA can require more farming experience for 
farmers receiving FO loans than for farmers receiving OL loans in general.  
It is expected that FSA, in its traditional role as lender of last resort, would have higher 
loss rates than other lenders since FSA borrowers are generally riskier than other borrowers. 
However, even small a decrease in loan losses could allow FSA to serve many more farmers.  
Survey Data from a Sample of FY 1994-1996 Direct FLP Loans  
To estimate the likelihood of an FSA direct FLP loan resulting in a loss and the 
relative size of the loss, farm loan managers (FLMs) located in FSA offices from across 
the United States were surveyed in 2004 to collect information on a sample of loans 
originated in FY 1994–1996. This time period was chosen because surveying loans 
originated more recently than this would likely have fewer loan losses associated with 
them since it may take several years for a loss to occur and to determine the loss amount. 
In addition, the Agricultural Credit Improvement Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-554) authorized 
the beginning farmer (BF) program, which continues to be targeted by FSA.  Thus, a 
survey of loans originated before 1994 would have resulted in few loans to beginning 
farmers. Three years were chosen so that unique characteristics of any one year would 
not unduly influence the variables observed. 
During the three years sampled, 34,026 OL, 3,083 FO, and 8,359 EM loans were 
originated. Financial information and demographic data were obtained from the Request   7
for Direct Loan Assistance (form FSA-410-1) and the Farm and Home Plan (form FmHA 
431-2) that borrowers complete as part of the application process. Information on these 
forms was not readily available electronically from any centralized database and could 
only be obtained by survey methods requiring FLM participation. 
The sampling frame of all FY 1994–1996 originations was sampled to insure 
representation across five loan types:  (1) FO loans for non-BF borrowers, (2) FO loans 
for BF borrowers, (3) OL loans for non-BF borrowers, (4) OL loans for BF borrowers, 
and (5) EM loans.  The sample was chosen to have gender, racial, geographical, and time 
representation as described in Nwoha et al. (2005).  The predominant FSA borrower race 
and gender are white and males.  Because white males were relatively so abundant, white 
males were sampled at a rate of one in eighteen, whereas all other gender and races were 
sampled at a rate of one in nine.
4   
There were 2,715 usable responses after cleaning the data out of a sample of 
3,004 for a 90 percent response rate. There was good geographical, gender, loan type, and 
racial representation so that no one particular cohort of interest was under- or over-
represented in the sample data. A copy of the survey instrument, a further description of 
the sampling procedure, and a full discussion of summary statistics of the data are 
included in Nwoha et al. 
Factors Associated with Loan Losses 
For the survey data, a loan loss is said to occur when the FLM indicates either the 
loan has experienced a debt write-down or the loan terminated due to foreclosure, 
                                                 
4 Because of the different sampling rates, all the statistical analyses are done using 
weights for the observations.  Since the two sampling rates were one in eighteen and one 
in nine, the respective weights were two and one.   8
bankruptcy, or debt write-off and there was a dollar amount recorded. Loan write-down 
and debt settlement (write-off) programs were established by the Agricultural Credit Act 
of 1987 (P.L. 100-233) to restructure delinquent loans with the objective of keeping 
farmers on the farm at the lowest cost to the Government. These programs are available 
to the borrower after servicing actions, such as reducing interest rates or rescheduling 
debt, have been considered when a loan becomes delinquent.  
A loan write-down is a situation where the borrower continues with FSA. The 
loan balance may be written down to the calculated net recovery value of the collateral 
(market value less liquidation costs). If this servicing action fails to produce a successful 
debt repayment plan, the debt settlement program is considered. Debt settlements and 
write-offs are situations where the borrower pays off the loan at the calculated net 
recovery value if the borrower is able to receive funds from other sources (USDA/ERS, 
1991). A debt settlement is considered final whereas a loan write-down and write-off may 
be subject to recapture if funds subsequently become available to the borrower. It is our 
understanding that recapture of loan write-downs and write-offs have been relatively 
infrequent. Therefore, they are considered as loan losses for this article.  
There are loans that are still active and may potentially have a loss occur in the 
future. However, these loans are assumed to have zero loss for the analysis presented here 
since none had occurred prior to the survey. 
Incidental Truncation Model 
To predict the likelihood of a loan loss and the relative size of the loss, a two-
equation, incidental truncation model is hypothesized as presented in Greene (2003) and 
applied in Dixon et al. (1997). The first equation (1) predicts the probability of a loan   9
experiencing a loss. The second equation (2) explains the variation in the percentage of 
the loan loss if a loss occurs.  The forms of these equations are: 
(1)   zi = β’xi + εi 
(2)   yi = γ’wi + ηi 
where zi is a binary variable indicating whether or not a loss has occurred for loan i. The 
variable yi is the dollar loss amount divided by the initial loan amount, in percent, for 
loan i when zi equals 1. The vectors xi and wi represent independent variables. Vectors β 
and γ contain parameters to be estimated. The error terms εi and ηi are assumed to be 
normally distributed with zero means and variances of one and σ
2. 
The dependent variable in the second equation is only observable if a loan loss 
occurs. This may result in incidental truncation, which occurs if the covariance of εi and 
ηi is not zero. A two-step estimation approach is used to obtain consistent estimates of the 
parameters in the second equation (Greene, 2003). 
The two-step approach is to estimate the selection equation as a probit model, 
then use the parameter estimates to estimate the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR), which 
accounts for any incidental truncation. The IMR is then included as a regressor in the 
regression equation. If the estimated IMR coefficient is statistically insignificant in the 
regression equation, it indicates insignificant incidental truncation and the IMR may be 
dropped from the regression equation. The regression equation can then be re-estimated 
using ordinary least squares. An estimation consideration is the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the regression equation.  To allow for this situation, the standard 
errors in the regression equation are estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent estimator.     10
Empirical Model Specification 
An exact description of the variables used in estimating the empirical model is 
given in table 2 and descriptive statistics are presented in table 3. The mean of dependent 
variable LOSS indicates 9 percent of the loans originated in FY 1994-1996 had a loss. 
For those loans with a loss, the average loss was 134 percent of the original loan amount 
(LOSSPCT). 
The same independent variables are hypothesized for both equations of the model, 
since variables thought to be associated with a loan loss occurrence are also thought to be 
associated with the percent of loan loss. The independent variables included are grouped 
into four categories:  (1) borrower demographics, (2) characteristics of the current loan, 
(3) borrower prior and current financial distress and involvement with FSA direct loans, 
and (4) borrower financial characteristics. Demographic variable age (AGE) averaged 41 
years of age and indicates the wealth of knowledge that the borrower has accumulated, 
which is expected to be negatively related to loan losses.
5  
Characteristics of the current loan include whether the loan is OL, one-year OL 
(ONEYR), FO, limited resource (LR), BF, or SDA.  These variables are binary and take 
on the value of 1 if the loan has the particular characteristic. It is expected that OL, 
ONEYR, and FO are negatively related to the incidence of a loss and the percentage of 
the loss relative to the effect of EM loans, which is captured by the constant term in the 
                                                 
5 Other demographic variables considered are number of years of farming experience 
(EXP), race (RACE), and gender (FEMALE). AGE and EXP are highly correlated, so 
only AGE is included in the estimated model since there are more observations for this 
variable than EXP. Binary variables RACE and GENDER were considered during pretest 
estimation, however, they are related to the SDA variable, which was included in the 
estimation.   11
estimated equations. These relationships are expected because OL and FO loans have 
lower loss rates than EM loans, as discussed earlier. It is expected that LR is unrelated to 
loss occurrence and loss percentage. An LR loan initially receives a lower interest rate so 
it will have a similar repayment capacity as a non-LR loan that does not receive this 
lower interest rate. Therefore, LR and non-LR loans should have a similar chance of 
success if all other non-repayment capacity characteristics of the borrowers and loans are 
the same. However, if the borrower and farm operation associated with an LR loan 
actually have more limited resources than those of a non-LR loan such that the lower 
interest rate does not fully compensate for these limitations, a positive relationship would 
be expected. There are no prior expectations on the signs of the BF and SDA coefficients.  
The third category of independent variables contains variables available at the 
time of origination about past and current involvement with direct loans and prior 
financial distress. Variables included in the estimation to gauge the level of involvement 
and how much experience the borrower has with FSA are the number of active OL loans 
at time of application (NUMOL) and similar measures for number of FO loans 
(NUMFO) and number of EM loans (NUMEM). The signs of the coefficients are 
unknown a priori.  A positive relationship between the number of loans and loan losses 
would indicate that as FSA borrowers become more reliant on FSA loans instead of loans 
from conventional creditors, the weaker financial situation they are in and the more likely 
they are to have a loan loss. Conversely, a negative relationship would indicate more and 
better information between the borrower and FLM such that the borrower has performed 
satisfactorily on the loans and the FLM is willing to extend additional credit to the 
borrower.    12
A binary variable indicating prior financial difficulty is created from responses to 
the question on the loan application: Has the proposed entity had a loan debt settlement 
action (DEBTSETT)?  The answer was yes for the recipients of 4 percent of the loans. 
DEBTSETT is expected to be positively related to loan losses. It suggests that if the 
borrower has had financial difficulty in the past, debt settlement in itself may not be 
enough assistance to have the borrower completely recover from the past problems. It 
also suggests that if the borrower has been able to settle debts when in financial difficulty 
in the past, the borrower may have learned from this experience and is thereby more 
likely to settle debts in the future. 
Borrower financial variables are computed from information documented in the 
Farm and Home Plan and available to the FLM prior to loan closing.  The total debt-to-
asset ratio (DA) averaged 0.69 and measures relative solvency. DA is expected to be 
positively related to losses. The current ratio (CR) had an average of 2.01 and is a 
measure of liquidity. CR is expected to be negatively related to losses. Repayment 
capacity (REPAY) is the ratio of the balance available to service principal and interest 
payments to the total amount of principal and interest due. REPAY averaged 1.16 and is 
expected to be negatively related to losses.   
An indicator of borrower farm type is the proportion of crop and livestock gross 
cash farm income from crops (CRPINPRO). Crop income is typically more variable than 
livestock income because weather variations have a larger impact on crop income than 
livestock income (Dixon et al., 2004; Settlage et al., 2001). Since crop income is riskier 
than livestock income, a positive relationship between the proportion of farm income 
from crops and loan losses is expected.    13
Finally, total cash farm income (TCFI) averaged $153 thousand and is a gross 
measure of cash farm income, which is an indicator of farm size. The a priori 
relationship between farm size and loan losses is unknown. It is commonly thought larger 
farms are more likely to take advantage of size economies and be more efficient. This 
suggests larger farms are less likely to have loan losses. However, larger farms, 
particularly farms with limited financial and managerial resources that are common 
among LR and non-LR FSA borrowers, may be difficult to manage effectively, resulting 
in a greater probability of a loan loss.   
Estimation Results for the Loan Loss Selection Equation 
The selection equation is estimated as a probit model and the parameter estimates 
are used to estimate the IMR. The IMR is included as a regressor in the regression 
equation and is found to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, the regression equation 
is re-estimated without the IMR using ordinary least squares. The results of the estimated 
selection and re-estimated regression equations are presented in tables 4 and 5.
6 
The test of the hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero is a test of equation 
validity. The χ
2 statistic for the selection equation and the F statistic for the regression 
equation clearly reject this hypothesis for both equations. Measures of explanatory power 
are also considered. The selection equation predicts 92 percent of the observations 
correctly as having a loss or not. This percentage is no better than if all loans are 
predicted to not have a loss, which would also result in 92 percent of the loans being 
                                                 
6 The regression results with and without the IMR were similar. The only differences 
were that FO was insignificant and OL was only significant at the 0.10 level in the 
regression equation with IMR as compared to FO and OL were significant at the 0.05 
level when IMR was excluded.   14
predicted correctly.  The regression equation has an R
2 of 0.197, indicating nearly 20 
percent of the variation in loan loss rates is explained by the independent variables, which 
is respectable for cross-sectional data, but also means much of the variation is left 
unexplained. This is not surprising considering economic, social, and personal events that 
occur after loan origination are likely to have a large impact on the potential success of a 
loan and are not captured by the model.
7  The selection and regression equations have 
significant coefficient estimates, which indicate explanatory power.  
The estimated selection equation has a number of variables with significant 
coefficients at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test (table 4). All of these coefficients have 
the anticipated signs. The DEBTSETT coefficient has a positive sign that indicates a 
positive relationship between the borrower having a previous debt settlement experience 
and FSA having a loan loss occur. This indicates that these borrowers are higher risk and 
they may not have received enough debt relief for them to be successful with future 
loans. 
This debt settlement result may also indicate moral hazard behavior. Moral hazard 
in this case is when farm borrowers may not do everything in their power to repay a loan 
if they think or, particularly, if they have experienced, that they will be able to settle for 
less than full repayment. 
While there was no expected sign a priori for the NUMFO coefficient, the 
negative sign supports the notion that information about the farm business and borrower 
                                                 
7 The model is incomplete because only information available at the time of loan 
origination is included, yet events occurring after loan closing that are likely to have a 
large impact on the loan are excluded. But the purpose of the article is to identify factors 
associated with loan losses from information that is available to FLMs at the time of loan 
origination so that FSA may decrease loan default costs.   15
is learned by the FLM because of their previous experience with the borrower. This 
information may be used to make a better decision, i.e., not make a bad loan.  It can also 
be argued that borrowers with more FO loans are more dedicated to paying off loans to 
increase their likelihood of keeping their land and protecting equity. 
Borrower financial characteristics are important in explaining the probability of a 
loan loss occurring. As expected, the probability of loan loss increases as the debt-to-
asset ratio increases (solvency decreases). Borrowers with high debt-to-asset ratios are 
highly leveraged and unable to withstand financial setbacks that are more likely to lead to 
loan losses. The repayment ratio is also related to loan losses. As expected, borrowers 
with greater repayment capacity are less likely to have a loss. In addition, the current 
ratio is related to loan losses, although at the lower level of statistical significance of 
0.10. As expected, borrowers with greater liquidity are less likely to have a loss. 
The size of the farm business (TCFI) is important in explaining loan loss 
occurrences for this sample of FSA loans. Larger farms, as measured by the farm’s 
planned total cash farm income, have a greater probability of having a loan loss. This 
supports the hypothesis that larger farm businesses require larger FSA loans, and the 
farmers may not have the necessary financial and managerial resources to successfully 
repay their loans. Also, these larger farms with larger loans may not have sufficient non-
farm income to assist in paying loan payments and family living expenses.
8  
The FO coefficient in the selection equation is marginally significant at the 0.10 
level implying FO loans have a lower probability of having a loss. This result is 
                                                 
8 The data support the hypothesis that total cash farm income and loan size are positively 
related. Also, the data support the hypothesis that total cash farm income and non-farm 
income are negatively related.    16
consistent with the data presented earlier showing FO loans have lower loss rates than 
EM loans.  
The marginal significance of the CRPINPRO coefficient indicates that the 
likelihood of a loan loss increases as the farm has more crop cash income relative to 
livestock cash income as expected. A conclusion from this result is that crop farms have a 
greater chance at a loan loss than livestock farms because crop income is riskier than 
livestock income. 
Estimation Results for the Loss Percentage Regression Equation 
All of the estimated regression equation coefficients that are significant have the 
anticipated signs (table 5). The negative signs on the estimated FO and OL coefficients 
indicate loan loss percentages are 154 and 105 percentage points less for FO and OL 
loans than for EM loans.
9 FO loans primarily rely on real estate to secure the loan. As 
was mentioned earlier, real estate values have increased steadily since 1994. Therefore, 
unpaid principal and interest on an FO loan are more likely to be repaid from liquidation 
of the real estate security compared with those on an EM loan, which may or may not be 
secured by real estate. Also, OL loans have lower loss rates than EM loans, as was 
discussed earlier. 
There was not an expected sign for the BF coefficient. However, the regression 
results indicate BF loans have a 143 percentage-point larger loss rate than the base case 
captured by the constant term.
10 Perhaps FLMs are more willing to use various servicing 
                                                 
9 The results from a loan loss amount regression indicate loan losses are $54,899 and 
$34,456 less for FO and OL loans than for EM loans. 
10  The results from a loan loss amount regression indicate loan losses are $40,880 more 
for BF loans than the base case captured by the constant term.   17
accommodations with BF loans than other loan types in an attempt to allow beginning 
farmers to continue farming. For example, multiple restructurings of unpaid principal and 
interest into ever larger loans may ultimately result in a large loan loss. However, survey 
data to test this hypothesis are unavailable. An alternative explanation for BF loans 
having larger loss percentages than non-BF loans when a loss occurs is that FSA 
beginning farmer loan losses occur earlier and thereby reflect larger losses since little 
principal has been retired relative to non-BF farmer loans. The data support the 
hypothesis that BF loan losses occurred sooner after loan origination than do non-BF loan 
losses.
11 
The repayment variable is the only borrower financial characteristic found to be 
significant in explaining the loan loss percentage. As the amount available for debt 
servicing increases relative to the amount required to service debt, the loan loss 
percentage decreases as expected. Although the planned repayment capacity was not 
sufficient to keep a loss from occurring, the loss percentage was smaller the greater the 
planned repayment capacity.  
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the lack of significance for debt-to-asset 
ratio. Although the sign of the coefficient indicates loan loss percent increases as debt-to-
asset ratio increases, the estimate is insignificant. Of course all the assets are not 
necessarily taken as collateral to securitize the FSA loan. Some assets are non-farm assets 
                                                 
11 Another alternative explanation is that BF farmers rely more on FSA credit than do 
non-BF farmers, such that when a loan loss occurs, few other loan sources are available.  
Surprisingly, the FSA proportion of total liabilities is less for BF farmers than non-BF 
farmers, although not significantly.  This in itself could contribute to the BF loans having 
larger losses. The non-FSA creditors for the BF farmers may have a superior lien position 
to FSA, such that when a loss occurs, the non-FSA creditors are more likely than FSA to 
be repaid from the liquidation of secured property.    18
and the borrowers are reluctant to offer additional collateral. A better measure would be 
collateral value relative to loan value, although the measure was not collected by the 
survey. It would be expected that loan loss percentage decreases as the collateral-to-loan 
value increases. 
Implications of the Loan Loss Estimations 
The results from the estimation of the selection and regression equations have 
implications for reducing loan losses. In simplest terms, loan loss occurrence may be 
reduced several ways:  by rejecting applicants who have had previous debt settlement 
experience; by encouraging loans to borrowers who already have FO loans; by requiring 
loans be given to farmers with lower debt-to-asset ratios, higher current ratios, and 
greater repayment capacity; by making fewer loans to crop farms; and by focusing loans 
on smaller farms. When a loan loss occurs, the percentage of the loan loss may be 
reduced by making proportionately more FO and OL loans relative to EM loans, 
decreasing the number of BF loans, and making loans to farmers with greater repayment 
capacity. Loss reductions are not as simple as this.  
The debt settlement result is quite interesting. The Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-127) limited the number of times FSA 
may provide debt forgiveness to a borrower to just one time. The legislation goes on to 
make borrowers receiving debt forgiveness ineligible for additional direct or guaranteed 
loans, with an exception of allowing OL loans for annual operating expenses in cases of 
certain loan write-downs (USDA/ERS, 1997). The debt settlement result from the 
selection equation suggests that FSA should strictly adhere to this legislation in an effort 
to reduce the number of loan losses. Even then, losses may occur on the annual operating   19
expense-type OL loans these borrowers subsequently receive. However, it would be 
difficult to justify disallowing these borrowers credit for annual operating expenses just 
after FSA has written down their debts to levels that are expected to be manageable.  
The debt settlement result brings up the broader question of allowing loan write-
downs, write-offs, and debt settlements in the first place without the borrower filing for 
liquidation bankruptcy. Although loan write-downs, write-offs, and debt settlement are 
limited to the net recovery value of liquidating secured property, these actions may 
promote unethical behavior, such that the borrower has learned from this experience and 
is more likely to settle debts in the future in this manner (moral hazard problem). 
However, debt settlement may be effective at keeping more farmers farming, although at 
a lower rate than farmers without debt settlement experience. Of the loans in the survey 
to farmers with a previous debt settlement, 63 loans did not report a loss and 36 loans did 
report a loss. Presumably, more farmers benefited from previous debt settlement and did 
not have a loss on a subsequent loan than did have a subsequent loan loss. In fact it could 
be argued that the prior debt settlement assistance received by the farmers with 
subsequent loan losses was insufficient assistance for the farmers to be successful with 
those loans.  
Financial characteristics are important in explaining the likelihood of a loan loss. 
Restricting loans to farms with less than a certain debt-to-asset ratio or greater than a 
certain repayment capacity would likely reduce the number of loan losses. However, 
many FSA applicants with high debt-to-asset ratios or low repayment ratios who receive 
loans would instead be denied credit by FSA if debt-to-asset and repayment limits are put 
in place. Some of these applicants—if granted loans—would have a loan loss, although   20
many more would likely make a positive contribution to agriculture if they received FSA 
loans. The same thing could be said for restricting loans to farms with greater than a 
certain current ratio. 
The results suggest that crop farms are more likely to have loan losses than 
livestock farms. Crop insurance and additional collateral beyond the crop itself are 
needed to decrease the chance of a loan loss. 
FSA already emphasizes providing loans to small farms. The selection equation 
results suggest that a continuation of this policy would limit the number of loan losses. 
FO loans have inherently low loss rates. Land values have increased, at least over 
the study period, so that the collateral value has increased as opposed to non-real estate 
collateral, which frequently decreases (depreciates) in value. This is particularly 
important because of the lengthy appeal process for FSA borrowers and the accruing of 
interest on delinquent loans. Also, a real estate-secured loan is more likely to be paid 
before a non-real estate-secured loan when cash flows are tight since the loss of real 
estate is often more critical to the farm business as a going concern than a non-real estate 
asset. This implies FSA loans need to be secured with ample collateral. Including 
farmland as collateral, when possible, would likely reduce loan losses.  
If FO loans have inherently low loan losses, EM loans have inherently high loan 
losses. It should be expected that EM loans have large loan losses because the farms with 
these loans have experienced large production and income losses from which the operator 
may never recover, even with the assistance of an EM loan. Attention should be given to 
having insurance products ex ante substitute for EM loans in certain circumstances. Over 
the years, farm policy has occasionally required farmers to purchase insurance in order to   21
receive farm program payments and qualify for emergency assistance. Putting this policy  
firmly in place should guard against adverse selection, i.e., farmers who are more likely 
to qualify for emergency assistance are less likely to purchase insurance since they 
believe the government will come to their assistance if a natural disaster occurs. Although 
an EM loan may allow the farmer to spread the income loss over a number of years 
following a disaster, the farmer may really need a grant (or an insurance check) to be able 
to recover. In addition, it is recommended that EM loans also be secured with ample 
collateral. 
It is difficult to provide a recommendation related to the finding that BF loans are 
related to greater loss rates. FSA has increased the emphasis on providing loans to 
beginning farmers. Beginning farmers are the most likely group of farmers to be denied 
credit from conventional creditors since they have little experience, no track record, and 
often, little equity.  Many small businesses outside of agriculture ultimately fail, and it 
should be expected that many small farm businesses are no different. These small farm 
businesses are risky by nature, and it is a matter of public policy whether or not the 
government will continue to assume the risk associated with providing loans to them.  
The results from the selection and regression equations indicate that limited 
resource loans are not a significant factor in explaining loan losses. This implies that the 
subsidized interest rate associated with limited resource loans is allowing farmers 
receiving LR loans to have similar success at repaying their loans as those farmers 
receiving non-LR loans. However, although the default subsidy appears to be similar for 
LR loans and non-LR loans, it comes at the cost of increased interest subsidy. 
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Summary 
The major component of subsidy costs for the FSA direct FLP in recent years is 
loan default cost. The outstanding principal, principal and interest loan losses, and loss 
rates have had a downward trend over the FY1994–2004 period. The average annual loss 
of principal and interest for OL, FO, and EM loans combined over this period was 
substantial at $576 million.  
The estimation results of the selection and regression equations have implications 
for reducing loan losses. The likelihood of a loan loss is found to be positively related to 
borrowers with previous debt settlement experience, higher debt-to-asset ratios, lower 
current ratios, less repayment capacity, crop farms, and larger farms and negatively 
related to borrowers already having or receiving an FO loan. When a loan loss occurs, the 
percentage of the loan loss is positively related to beginning farmer loans and negatively 
related to borrowers with FO and OL loans and greater repayment capacity.  Loan losses 
are not found to be significantly related to limited resource or socially disadvantaged 
loans. 
The concept of “creditworthy” is not well defined for the purposes of loan 
eligibility for the direct FLP.  In essence, FSA’s mission is to provide credit to riskier 
“creditworthy” borrowers. The natural consequence is that FSA loan loss rates are higher 
than for conventional creditors. Whether FSA borrowers are too risky, or should even 
riskier borrowers be included, are policy questions and are open to discussion. Should 
farmers with debt settlement experience be denied credit or should they have even more 
debt forgiven? Are grants instead of EM loans a more cost effective way to assist farmers 
after a disaster? Should beginning farmer loans no longer be mandated because of their   23
large loss rates? Would restricting loans to farms with less than a certain debt-to-asset 
ratio or greater than a certain repayment capacity reduce loan losses? Such attempts to cut 
losses systematically would imply denying credit to some current borrowers, the majority 
of which would repay their loans without having a loan loss. 
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Table 1.  Principal and Interest Losses for FSA Direct OL, FO, and EM Loans, FY 1994–2004 (millions of dollars) 
OL
a  FO
b  EM TOTAL 
Fiscal  
Year  Outstanding 
principal 
Losses Percent Outstanding 
principal 
Losses Percent  Outstanding 
principal 
Losses Percent Outstanding 
principal 
Losses Percent 
1994  $3,100  $260  8.4% $5,181  $177  3.4% $3,876  $618  15.9%  $12,157  $1,055  8.7% 
1995  $2,966 $206 6.9%  $4,841  $137 2.8%  $3,435 $470  13.7%  $11,242 $813 7.2% 
1996  $2,705  $113  4.2% $4,664  $188  4.0% $3,139  $824  26.2%  $10,508  $1,125  10.7% 
1997  $2,656  $146  5.5% $4,375  $89  2.0% $2,662  $396  14.9% $9,693  $631  6.5% 
1998  $2,589  $144  5.6% $4,119  $72  1.7% $2,395  $357  14.9% $9,103  $574  6.3% 
1999  $2,559  $147  5.7% $3,857  $64  1.7% $2,104  $229  10.9% $8,520  $440  5.2% 
2000  $2,692  $116  4.3% $3,641  $49  1.4% $2,041  $248  12.1% $8,375  $413  4.9% 
2001  $2,678  $109  4.1% $3,560  $48  1.3% $1,907  $135  7.1% $8,146  $293  3.6% 
2002  $2,758  $130  4.7% $3,484  $53  1.5% $1,749  $215  12.3% $7,991  $398  5.0% 
2003  $2,715  $128  4.7% $3,273  $47  1.4% $1,523  $161  10.6% $7,512  $336  4.5% 
2004  $2,723  $126  4.6% $3,031  $40  1.3% $1,405  $93  6.7% $7,159  $260  3.6% 
Total    $1,625  5.3%   $964  2.0%   $3,746  13.2%   $6,336  6.0% 
 
Source:  FSA-KCMO-FO Report Codes 616, 541 and 523. FY 1994–2000 Loss Data from General Ledger. FY 2001–2004 Loss Data from DSTH FOCUS File. Principal is beginning-of-
year outstanding principal. Losses include both principal and interest. Beginning in FY 2003, losses include judgment cases. 
a Includes youth loans. 
b Includes Non-Farm Enterprise loans. 
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Table 2.  Incidental Truncation Model Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables 
LOSS  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan experienced a loan write-down or debt write-off or 
both, 0 otherwise, 
LOSSPCT  Amount of loan write-down or write-off divided by initial loan amount, in percent, 
Independent variables 
AGE  Age in years of the operator at time of loan application, 
OL  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is OL, 0 otherwise, 
ONEYR  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is one-year OL loan, 0 otherwise, 
FO  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan is FO, 0 otherwise, 
LR  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a limited  resource assistance code, 0 otherwise, 
BF  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a beginning farmer assistance code, 0 otherwise, 
SDA  Binary variable with value of 1 if loan has a socially disadvantaged assistance code, 0 
otherwise, 
NUMOL  Number of active OL loans at time of loan application, 
NUMFO  Number of active FO loans at time of loan application, 
NUMEM  Number of active EM loans at time of loan application, 
DEBTSETT  Binary variable with value of 1 if applicant had ever been released from personal liability as 
part of a debt settlement action, 0 otherwise, 
DA  Total liabilities divided by total assets, 
CR  Total current farm assets divided by total current farm liabilities, 
REPAY  Balance available for debt service divided by total debt service due that year, 
CRPINPRO  Proportion of crop and livestock cash farm income from crops, 
TCFI  Total cash farm income from crop, livestock, and other farm income in thousands of dollars. 
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Table 3.  Weighted Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Incidental Truncation 
Model 
Variables Mean  Std.  dev.  N 
LOSS 0.09  0.29 2,289
LOSSPCT (%)  133.56  196.12 184
AGE 41.17  12.83 2,285
OL 0.71  0.45 2,715
ONEYR 0.39  0.49 2,715
FO 0.11  0.32 2,715
EM 0.17  0.38 2,715
LR 0.28  0.45 2,715
BF 0.23  0.42 2,715
SDA 0.07  0.25 2,715
NUMOL 1.41  1.71 2,282
NUMFO 0.44  0.85 2,289
NUMEM 0.42  1.00 2,288
DEBTSETT 0.04  0.20 2,414
DA 0.69  0.83 2,279
CR 2.01  9.36 1,932
REPAY 1.16  1.19 2,290
CRPINPRO 0.61  0.42 2,278
TCFI ($1000)  153.47  161.46 2,301
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Table 4.  Estimated Loan Loss Selection Equation by Probit Model 






CONSTANT -1.172 0.364 -3.218 0.001 
AGE -0.007 0.004 -1.639 0.101 
FO -0.478 0.269 -1.780 0.075 
OL 0.185 0.150 1.233 0.217 
ONEYR -0.166 0.113 -1.464 0.143 
LR 0.139 0.110 1.264 0.206 
BF 0.125 0.147 0.852 0.394 
SDA 0.110 0.193 0.569 0.570 
DEBTSETT 0.848 0.166 5.109 0.000 
NUMOL -0.004 0.030 -0.118 0.906 
NUMFO -0.132 0.064 -2.062 0.039 
NUMEM 0.007 0.047 0.153 0.878 
DA 0.222 0.069 3.221 0.001 
CR -0.064 0.035 -1.829 0.067 
REPAY -0.446 0.225 -1.986 0.047 
CRPINPRO 0.229 0.124 1.839 0.066 
TCFI 0.001 0.000 3.637 0.000 
n 1,738  
χ
2  98.907  p-value  0.000 
% Correct
a  91.945     
a Percent of observations in the sample correctly classified by the probit model.   29
Table 5.  Estimated Loan Loss Percentage Regression Equation 
Dependent variable is LOSSPCT 
Independent 
variable 
Coefficient Standard error  t-ratio  p-value 
CONSTANT 339.045 116.059 2.921 0.004 
AGE 1.085 1.153 0.941 0.349 
FO -154.415 54.816 -2.817 0.006 
OL -105.421 46.841 -2.251 0.026 
ONEYR -23.745 27.222 -0.872 0.385 
LR 17.793 35.065 0.507 0.613 
BF 142.810 63.105 2.263 0.026 
SDA 2.261 34.074 0.066 0.947 
DEBTSETT -4.076 30.164 -0.135 0.893 
DA 23.177 38.354 0.604 0.547 
CR 8.993 7.365 1.221 0.225 
REPAY -222.740 79.762 -2.793 0.006 
CRPINPRO 49.905 32.268 1.547 0.125 
TCFI -0.030 0.034 -0.872 0.385 
n 124      
F 2.080   p-value  0.021 
R
2  0.197     
      
 